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By all accounts, any serious attempt to combat climate change1 in the

* Associate Professor of Law and Co-Director for the Energy Management &
Innovation Center, University of Texas School of Law.
1. I will proceed on the following premises: (i) that the Earth’s climate is
warming; (ii) that that warming is driven largely by human activity, primarily emissions
of greenhouse gases (“GHGs”) and deforestation; and (iii) it is desirable from both the
technical and economic point of view to reduce the growth of carbon emissions, and
stabilize concentrations of GHG emissions in the atmosphere. While there is no
consensus in support of these views among the American public, an overwhelming
majority of the world’s climatologists and geoscientists support the first two premises
above. In the words of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (“IPCC”), it is
“very likely” that human activity is driving climate change. See Summary for Policymakers,
I NTERGOVERNMENTAL P ANEL ON C LIMATE C HANGE (2007), http://www.ipcc.ch/
publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/spms2.html. For an accessible discussion of the impact
of GHG emissions on climate, see The Causes of Global Climate Change, CTR. FOR
CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS (Aug. 2008), available at http://www. pewclimate.org/
docUploads/global-warming-science-brief-august08.pdf. In May of 2011, the National
Academy Of Sciences and the National Research Council issued a report once again
endorsing the notion that global warming is a pressing national problem requiring policy
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United States must address the ways in which Americans produce and
consume electricity. Coal-fired power remains the largest fuel source in
the American electric system, representing about half of the U.S.
generation.2 Coal and natural gas-fired generation, which emits about
half as much carbon dioxide equivalent (“CO2e”),3 comprise a strong
majority of the total, dwarfing the contribution of carbon-free sources of
electricity, like nuclear, hydroelectric power, wind, and solar energy.
Furthermore, America’s nuclear power plants are old and aging fast.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering applications
for about 20 new nuclear power plants,4 but the Fukushima disaster in
2011 has cast doubt on the wisdom of nuclear power, and even if
licensed, it would take a decade or more for nuclear plants to be built.
attention. See America’s Climate Choices, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. (2011), available at
http://nas-sites.org/americasclimatechoices/files/2011/05/ACC _Final_Report_Brief04.pdf.
GHG concentrations in the atmosphere have increased from their pre-industrial level
of 280 parts per million (“ppm”) to their current level of about 390 ppm. See CO2 NOW,
http://co2now.org/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011) (tracking atmospheric concentrations of
CO2). Because GHGs dissipate slowly in the atmosphere, today’s emissions will have
warming effects for many years to come. Among economists and policy analysts, a
majority support the view that the net effects of climate change will be negative. See,
e.g., Frank Ackerman et al., The Economics of 350: The Benefits and Costs of Climate
Change Stabilization, ECON. FOR EQUITY & THE ENV’T NETWORK 9 (Oct. 2009), available
at http://www.e3network.org/papers/Economics_of_350.pdf; NICHOLAS STERN, THE
ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: STERN REVIEW vi-vii (2006). “Over the last decade,
climatologists and some political leaders have concluded that growth in [GHG]
emissions ought to be managed so as to stabilize concentrations at a level of 450 ppm or
lower, in order to minimize the probability of catastrophic effects. The 450 ppm number
represents an estimate of the maximum atmospheric concentration that is necessary to
keep global mean temperature increases at 2° C or lower. However, there is considerable
disagreement among climatologists and others over the desirable maximum concentration of
[GHGs] in the atmosphere. Some analysts argue that the 450 ppm figure is too high,
because climate change is taking place considerably faster than scientists were predicting
only a short time ago.” There is also considerable disagreement about the geographic
distribution of those effects, and about whether the costs of combating climate change
exceed the benefits for the United States. For an analysis of these policy debates and
brief description of the climatological literature, see David B. Spence, Regulation,
‘Republican Moments,’ and Energy Policy Reform, at 7 (2011) (on file with author).
2. Electric Power Annual 2009, U.S. E NERGY I NFO . ADMIN. 2 (Apr. 2009),
available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/archive/03482009.pdf.
3. Carbon dioxide is the most plentiful GHG, by volume in the atmosphere.
Other GHGs, such as nitrous oxide and methane, have even greater heat-trapping qualities,
but are much less plentiful. Hence, most discussions of GHG emissions calculate emissions
and emissions reductions using carbon dioxide as an index gas, and speak of “carbon
dioxide equivalent” (“CO2e”).
4. “By issuing a combined license (COL), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) authorizes the licensee to construct and . . . operate a nuclear power plant at a
specific site” for 40 years. The NRC also issues separate early site permits and operating
licenses for applicants not wishing to pursue a COL. Combined License Applications for
New Reactors, U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMM’N, http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/newreactors/col.html (last updated March 10, 2011) (providing a table with information to
the public on the COL applications the NRC has received as of March 10, 2011).
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Similarly, most of the profitable locations for hydroelectric projects were
taken up long ago, and few analysts anticipate large-scale growth in
hydroelectric development in the United States.5 For that reason, some
argue that the United States must rely more heavily on renewable energy
sources like wind and solar power, as well as conservation, if it is to
achieve the goal of stabilizing carbon emissions.6
More specifically, Robert Socolow and Stephen Pacala suggest an
approach for stabilizing greenhouse gas (“GHG”) concentrations that
focuses on so-called “stabilization wedges.”7 These wedges represent sets
of measures (of roughly equal effect8) that society can take to reduce
growth in the rate of GHG emissions sufficiently to stabilize GHG
concentrations at roughly 500 parts per million.9 Several of these sets of

5. While it is possible that rising electricity prices could make some undeveloped
sites economical, or cause owners of existing dams to expand, environmental groups are
exerting downward pressure on hydroelectric generating capacity, seeking the
decommissioning of existing hydroelectric facilities on environmental grounds when
they come up for relicensing. This effort has been led by environmental groups like
American Rivers. See, e.g., Edwards Mfg. Co., 84 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,227, 62,091 (1998)
(authorizing a negotiated removal of the Edwards dam on the Kennebec River in order to
restore historic salmon migration routes); FPL Energy Maine Hydro, LLC, 107 F.E.R.C.
¶ 61,120, 61,403 (2004) (authorizing dam removal in connection with surrender of a
license); Dams and Dam Removal, AM. RIVERS, http://www.americanrivers.org/ourwork/restoring-rivers/dams/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
6. See Martin L. Hoffert, Farewell to Fossil Fuels?, 329 SCI. 1292, 1293 (2010),
available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/329/5997/1292.full.pdf (“Maintaining
world economic growth and keeping atmospheric CO2 concentrations below 450 ppm,
even with continuing improvements in energy intensity (the amount of CO2 emitted per
unit of energy, and a proxy for increasing energy efficiency and less consumptive
lifestyles), will require ~30 terawatts (TW) of power from carbon-neutral sources at midcentury.”).
7. “We idealize the 50-year emissions reductions as a perfect triangle in Fig. 1B.
Stabilization is represented by a ‘flat’ trajectory of fossil fuel emissions at 7 GtC/year,
and BAU is represented by a straight-line ‘ramp’ trajectory rising to 14 GtC/year in
2054. The ‘stabilization triangle,’ located between the flat trajectory and BAU, removes
exactly one third of BAU emissions. To keep the focus on technologies that have the
potential to produce a material difference by 2054, we divide the stabilization triangle
into seven equal ‘wedges.’ A wedge represents an activity that reduces emissions to the
atmosphere that starts at zero today and increases linearly until it accounts for 1 GtC/year
of reduced carbon emissions in 50 years. It thus represents a cumulative total of 25 GtC
of reduced emissions over 50 years.” Stephen Pacala & Robert Socolow, Stabilization
Wedges: Solving the Climate Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies,
305 SCI. 968, 968 (2004), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/305/5686/ 968.full.
8. Each wedge would produce a decrease in projected carbon emissions out of
roughly 25 Gt by 2050. Id. at 968.
9. The authors call them “wedges” because adoption of each measure would
reduce the slope of the curve that depicts growth in GHG concentrations over time.
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measures would prescribe fairly drastic increases in our reliance on
renewable electricity, as well as the adoption of energy efficiency
investments. For example, Socolow and Pacala call for raising average
fuel economy standards for vehicles to 60 miles per gallon, doubling our
reliance on nuclear energy, and increasing our wind and solar electric
generating capacity by factors of 50 and 700, respectively.10 Whether or
not these specific prescriptions are followed, any serious attempt to stem
the growth of carbon emissions must include significant increases in
renewable electricity, as well as energy efficiency investments.
These changes, in turn, will have implications for the shape and operation
of the American electric grid. It is logical to infer that if we increase the
percentage of electricity that comes from clean sources like wind and
solar power, we will realize a corresponding decrease in the GHG
emissions associated with electricity generation. However, even if wind
and solar power can overcome the problem of cost competitiveness to
assume a growing proportion of our electric generation mix, that increase
will not necessarily produce corresponding decreases in GHG emissions
because wind and solar power is intermittent. Because it is intermittent, it
must be backed up by a more reliable source of power, such as coal or
natural gas-fired generation. When fossil fuel generation is used to back
up intermittent sources, however, it operates much less efficiently, emitting
more GHGs per unit of energy produced than when it is used to serve
base load. This means that while the increased reliance upon renewable
electricity may represent an environmental improvement (in terms of
GHG emissions), it may be a much smaller improvement than most
expect.
Similarly, it is equally logical to infer that rationally self-interested
consumers will take advantage of potential money-saving opportunities
represented by electricity conservation and the opportunity to manage
demand. However, there exists a variety of behavioral and other
impediments to the realization of these cost-saving (or money-making)
opportunities.
In Part I of this essay, I outline some of the background characteristics
of the electric grid, the way it is operated, and the way regulators and
grid operators manage the sale and transmission of electricity across it.
In Part II, I explore the opportunities and potential problems associated
with integrating intermittent, renewable sources of electric generation
into the grid. This discussion includes a review of a number of recent
studies examining the GHG emissions effects of using fossil fueled
Thus, each section of the area under the GHG concentration growth curve looks like a
wedge. Id. at 969 fig.1(B).
10. Id. at 969–71.
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generation to back up wind power, as well as the U.S. Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission’s (“FERC”) recent rulemakings addressing this
issue. Part III explores the potential cost and pollution reduction savings
associated with better management of our electricity demand, and why
many of those opportunities remain unrealized. This discussion includes
a review of the behavioral economics literature addressing this phenomenon,
as well as FERC’s recent rulemakings aimed at reducing the growth in
peak demand by encouraging demand response. Part IV offers some
concluding thoughts.
I. THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC GRID
The American electric grid is an enormous network of transmission
and distribution lines designed to transmit electric current from large
central generating stations to “load”—that is, consumers of electricity.
We make a distinction between transmission, the movement of electricity
over longer distances at higher voltages,11 and distribution, the delivery
of electricity at lower voltages12 from high-voltage transmission lines to
end-users. Modern electric transmission systems became possible only
after George Westinghouse’s promotion of an alternating current
transmission system in the late 1800s.13 Westinghouse’s system built upon
Nikola Tesla’s work with transformers (which enabled companies to
increase and decrease voltage at key points in the system).14 Most of the
11. “Voltage” is the force by which electric current moves along transmission or
distribution lines. Generally, transmission lines move power at voltages exceeding 110
kilovolts (“kV”); some transmission lines, however, move power at voltages in excess of
1,000 kV.
12. Distribution lines move power at less than 110 kV, typically between 4 and
34.5 kV.
13. Prior to this innovation, electric power could move in only one direction along
transmission lines. Alternating current allowed for bidirectional movement. In the early
years of the electric industry, Thomas Edison championed direct current transmissions.
Westinghouse’s view, however, ultimately prevailed, leading to the alternating current
system we use today. For a comprehensive description of these early days of electric
power, see MAURY KLEIN, THE POWER MAKERS: STEAM, ELECTRICITY, AND THE MEN
WHO INVENTED MODERN AMERICA (2008).
14. Transformers are used to increase or decrease voltage at junctions in the grid.
For example, a transformer at the junction of a high-voltage transmission line in a
distribution line may step power down to the appropriate distribution voltage. A
transformer at the junction of a power plant connector and a high-voltage transmission
line may step power up to the appropriate transmission voltage. Power must be stepped
down to reach voltages used in homes and businesses, typically between 120 and 240
Volts. Id. at 329–30.
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modern American electric grid consists of alternating current lines organized
into three large systems, as shown in Figure 1: the Eastern Interconnection,
the Western Interconnection and the Texas Interconnection.15
FIGURE 1: THE AMERICAN ELECTRIC GRID*

*Figure source: U.S. Dept. of Energy16
Within each of these three systems, virtually every generator of electricity
is connected (however indirectly) with virtually every consumer by
electricity. In an alternating current system, the seller of electricity cannot
steer her particular electrons or particular bits of electric current to its
customer. Rather, electric current follows the path of least resistance,
irrespective of the intentions of individual buyers and sellers of electricity.
That is, in Figure 2, if Generator B wishes to sell 100 kilowatt-hours
(“kWh”) of electricity to Consumer 4, Generator B cannot direct that

15. The Texas interconnection is separated from the remainder of the American
grid primarily to avoid federal jurisdiction under the Federal Power Act, though Texas
avoids some federal regulation only because of cooperation of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) and Congress. For a description of this separate
Texas system, see DAVID SPENCE & DARREN BUSH, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING THE
TEXAS STORY 9–21 (L. Lynne Kiesling & Andrew N. Kleit eds., 2009).
16. Frequently-Asked Questions (FAQS) About Transmission Planning in the
Western Interconnection, WESTERN ELEC. COORDINATING COUNCIL 5, available at http://
www.wecc.biz/Planning/TransmissionExpansion/RTEP/Transmission%20Planning/RTE
P%20FAQs.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
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power to Consumer 4 over particular transmission and distribution lines,
nor will all of the power travel across the most direct route to get to
Consumer 4. Rather, as the dotted lines in Figure 2 indicate, once
Generator B produces that electricity and dispatches it to the grid, some
of the power will take a rather indirect or “circuitous” route. How much
current moves along each of these two routes depends upon a number of
factors, including differential levels of resistance in lines along these
routes. This tendency for electric current to take multiple paths to its
destination is known as “loop flow.”
FIGURE 2: “LOOP FLOWS”

Because of loop flows, the grid’s generation and consumption loads
must be kept in balance. That is, at any given point in time, the amount
of electricity being dispatched to the grid by generators must equal the
amount been taken off the grid by consumers. If loads are not balanced,
the system will fail, causing blackouts, for example. The grid’s day-today managers, the “control area operators,” perform this balancing
function. Typically, there is quite a bit of variation in load, both over the
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course of a day, and seasonally.17 Residential electric loads, for example,
tend to be highest in the late afternoon and early evenings, when people
get home from work, but before they go to bed. Seasonal loads are highest
in the summer and hot weather climates, and in the winter in cold weather
climates. To keep loads in balance, control area operators must marshal
a great deal of information about historic usage patterns, weather
forecasts, generators’ operational plans, and more to estimate levels of
supply and demand in the near term and longer-term future. With that
information, control area operators can have supply resources ready and
available18 to dispatch power when demand increases; or, they can have
demand-side resources ready to curtail their usage19 should that become
necessary to balance the load.
For most of the history of the American electric system, these
balancing services were performed by vertically-integrated, investorowned electric utilities, companies that owned generating facilities and
the transmission and distribution lines necessary to get electric power
from plants to customer. Under the traditional system of public utility rate
regulation, these investor-owned utilities were granted monopoly status,
chartered by the state public utilities commissions to be the sole provider
of electric service within their specified geographic areas.20 In return,
they were obligated to provide reliable service on a nondiscriminatory
basis. Rate regulation allowed (and still allows, where it remains in
place) investor-owned utilities to recover through rates all of their reasonably
incurred costs, and to earn a fair return on their prudently made
17. See Matt Davison et al., Development of a Hybrid Model for Electrical Power
Spot Prices, 17 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYS. 257, 260 (2002), available at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1007890 (“It is known that
power demand is tightly linked to weather and follows predictable seasonal and diurnal
patterns.”).
18. We refer to these excess supply resources as “reserves.” “Spinning reserves”
are generating facilities that are ramped up and ready to dispatch power to the grid at a
moment’s notice.
19. “Load control and demand side load management programs have been
implemented in many competitive power markets. These programs can be classified as a
set of system operator (usually ISO)-based programs that allow end users to provide
interruptible load as a commodity in the electricity market . . . . These programs provide
various incentives for end users to reduce load or use on-site generation during high
price periods.” See P. Jazayri et. al., A Survey of Load Control Programs for Price and
System Stability, 20 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON POWER SYS. 1504, 1504 (2005), available
at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/search/freesrchabstract.jsp?tp=&arnumber=1490604.
20. By the early 1900s, most states had established utilities commissions charged
with the task of regulating electric and gas companies, and setting their retail rates. The
first state public utility commission was created in the late 19th century. This was the
Massachusetts Board of Gas and Electric Light Commissioners. Alfred E. Forstall,
Government Control of the Price of Gas, in PUBLIC POLICY 329, 332 (1900) (describing
the Massachusetts commission as the “only organized attempt at government control of
the gas business in the United States”).
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investments—that is, investments in capital necessary to provide these
generation, transmission and distribution services.21
In this system, investor-owned utilities traditionally generated most of
the power they sold to their customers, and supplied it over lines they
owned. Therefore, balancing loads was primarily an intra-company
activity. On those rare occasions when it was necessary to coordinate
transmission or distribution activities with the neighboring utility (for
example, because one utility wishes to buy wholesale power from its
neighbor during times of shortage, or to move power across service area
lines in order to relieve congestion or ensure system reliability),
neighboring utilities coordinated these transactions informally, knowing
that the cost of the transaction would be recovered through rates. Wholesale
rates were regulated by FERC,22 but state utilities commissions typically
allowed wholesale power purchase costs to be passed through to customers
in retail rates. This informal coordination process took on greater
importance after the 1965 blackout on the Eastern Seaboard. That accident
prompted the formation of the North American Electric Reliability
Council (“NERC”). NERC organized the creation of informal “power
pools,” regional associations of electric utilities charged with ensuring
system reliability and facilitating reliability-based coordination of grid
management activities between utilities.
In the 1980s, the electricity industry began to change in ways that
complicated the task of grid management. The seeds of change were
sown in the 1970s. First, in 1973, the Supreme Court issued its decision
in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States,23 upholding charges of antitrust
violations against an electric utility that refused to “wheel” power (that
is, to transmit power for third parties over its own transmission lines)
from a third-party supplier to a municipal utility. Prior to the Otter Tail
decision, municipal utilities lying entirely within the service area of
investor-owned electric utility were captive wholesale customers. The

21. The standard way of describing the ratemaking process is to say that in rate
cases, utility commissions typically make rate decisions using the following equation: R
= Br + O, where R represents the company’s total revenue requirements, B represents
the rate base, r represents the permissible rate of return on investment, and O represents
permissible operating expenses. Assets that are used and useful to the company’s task of
supplying electric service are includable within rate base, and are those on which the
company is guaranteed a fair return.
22. Under the Federal Power Act, FERC is charged with ensuring that wholesale
rates are “just and reasonable.” Federal Power Act § 205, 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006).
23. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 378 (1973).
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Otter Tail decision raised the prospect that these municipal utilities and
others might one day be able to buy power from someone other than the
local investor-owned utility, and to have that power delivered over the
utility’s transmission and distribution lines. Five years later, the passage
of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 197824 (“PURPA”)
promoted both electricity conservation programs and the construction of
“alternative” forms of electricity production by providing financial
incentives to new, nonutility producers25 of renewable electricity and
cogeneration.26 The presence of nonutility generators in the market created
additional pressure for nondiscriminatory access to the electric grid as a
transmission service; these nonutility generators wanted to sell their
electricity directly to retailers or industrial customers. Congress responded
to that pressure in the Energy Policy Act of 199227 by authorizing
FERC to order electric utilities to wheel power over their transmission
lines.28 FERC exercised that power in 1996 when it promulgated Orders
888 and 889, mandating (i) the unbundling of electricity transmission
from electricity sales in wholesale markets, and (ii) that owners of
transmission lines act as common carriers providing transmission service
on a nondiscriminatory basis to affiliated and non-affiliated companies
alike.29 As a consequence of this unbundling, FERC began to authorize
wholesale sellers to charge market-based rates.30

24. Policy Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. §§ 2602–3211 (2005).
25. In PURPA parlance, these nonutility generators were called “qualifying facilities”
(“QFs”) because they qualified for the financial benefits offered under the statute.
26. PURPA defined “alternative” energy facilities to include various forms
of renewable energy like solar, wind, and geothermal, as well as small hydroelectric facilities
and cogeneration plants. Cogeneration facilities produce electricity as well as usable
heat energy, and most of the many hundreds of cogeneration facilities built after the passage
of PURPA in the 1980s were gas-fired.
27. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486 § 721, 106 Stat. 2915
(1992) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824j (2005)) (provision for open access to
transmission lines).
28. Id. §§ 711–12.
29. Order 888 required transmission line owners to file so-called “open-access
tariffs” offering nondiscriminatory transmission services, and to “functionally unbundle”
transmission from electricity sales. Order No. 888, Promoting Wholesale Competition
Through Open-Access Nondiscriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, 61
Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37). Order 889
mandated transparency in transmission services by requiring all takers of transmission
services (including affiliates of the transmission owner) to take such services using an
open-access posting system. Order No. 889, Open-Access Same-Time Information
System (Formerly Real-Time Information Networks) and Standards of Conduct, 61 Fed.
Reg. 21,737 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 37).
30. See, e.g., Entergy Services, Inc., 58 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,234, 61,753 (1992) (authorizing
electricity sales at market-based rates).
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At around the same time, a sizeable minority of American states began
to introduce competition and market-based rates into their retail markets,31
with California,32 Texas,33 and New York34 leading the way. Because of
all of these developments, many incumbent utilities in these states sold
most of their generation assets or spun them off into subsidiaries, increasing
the profile of independent merchant generators, marketers, and brokers
within the industry. Consequently, the number and volume of armslength transactions on wholesale electricity markets grew by leaps and
bounds, straining the capacity of both the transmission grid and regulators.
In response, FERC pushed owners of transmission lines to form
“independent system operators” (“ISOs”) and “regional transmission
organizations” (“RTOs”) to help manage the grid, ensure system reliability,
and guard against discrimination and the exercise of market power in the
provision of transmission services.35 By the turn of the century, active
electricity trading hubs had arisen around several of these ISOs and
RTOs, including the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (“PJM”) RTO,
the New York ISO, the California ISO, and the New England RTO.36 In
states that opted out of retail restructuring, some public utilities continued to
generate most of the electricity they sold to customers, while others satisfied
most of their electricity needs from wholesale markets. In any case, because
electricity demand is highly variable (both daily and seasonally), most
electricity retailers must participate in spot markets in order to balance
supply with demand.

31. See The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: An Update, U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 70–77 (Oct. 2000), available at http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/electricity/
chg_stru_update/update2000.pdf.
32. See Assem. B. 1890, 1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999).
33. See TEX. UTIL. CODE ANN. §§ 39.001–.910 (Vernon 2002).
34. See In re Competitive Opportunities Regarding Elec. Serv., 1999 WL 1442552
(N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Dec. 6, 1999) (No. 94-E-0952); In re Competitive Opportunities
Regarding Elec. Serv., 1996 WL 293495 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n May 20, 1996) (No.
94-E-0952).
35. Order No. 2000, Regional Transmission Organizations, 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,285
(1999) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 53).
36. For a description of the status of electricity trading hubs at the turn of the
century, see The Changing Structure of the Electric Power Industry 2000: An Update, supra
note 31, at 9, 78.
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FIGURE 3: ISOS AND RTOS IN NORTH AMERICA, 2009

Figure source: U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission37

In this new regime, more electricity travels farther than ever before.
Individual ISOs and RTOs manage grid operations and electricity spot
markets over geographic areas that are many times larger than even the
largest investor-owned utility service area that existed under the traditional
regime. Figure 3, a map of North American ISOs and RTOs, illustrates
this point. Thus, one of the tasks of today’s regulators and regulated
companies alike is to adapt 20th-century grid to 21st-century electricity
markets. These ISOs and RTOs oversee organized wholesale electric
markets in at least three important ways. First, they oversee the operation of
the electricity spot market, which typically involves matching day-ahead
bids from buyers and sellers to produce a market-clearing price, typically
one that will be paid by all buyers and sellers of spot electricity. Second,
they schedule so-called ancillary services: reserves, spinning reserves,
and regulation. The term “reserves” refers to the generating capacity
that is currently unused but which is available to serve load; if that
capacity is already running, so that operator may dispatch its electricity
to the grid on very short notice, it qualifies as “spinning reserves.”38
37. RTO/ISO Map, FERC, available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indusact/rto/rto-map.asp.
38. See Willett Klempton & Jasna Tomić, Vehicle-to-Grid Power Fundamentals:
Calculating Capacity and Net Revenue, 144 J. OF POWER SOURCES 268, 271 (2005), available
at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0378775305000352#SECX9 (“Spinning

278

SPENCE - FINAL NO AUTHOR EDITS TO ACCEPT (2) (DO NOT DELETE)

1/25/2016 11:29 AM

Regulation

[VOL. 3: 267, 2011–12]

SAN DIEGO JOURNAL OF CLIMATE & ENERGY LAW

“Regulation” services are the grid management activities that maintain
voltages at their proper level, to ensure grid reliability.39 Third, operators
ensure that there is sufficient generating capacity over the long term to
meet projected demand. They can ensure adequate reserves in either or
both of two ways: one way is by including the value of capacity in energy
prices, as is done in the ERCOT ISO system in Texas;40 another is to create
and manage separate capacity markets in which owners of electricity
generators are paid to have capacity available in the event that capacity
is needed in the future. In the PJM, New England, and New York systems,
for example, capacity markets are run.41
Thus, the maintenance of a reliable electric grid poses technical and
economic challenges. Each new source of electricity, including renewables,
must be operated in such a way as to maintain grid reliability. Furthermore,
ISOs and RTOs must try to find a way to ensure that each new “source”
of generation (demand-side or supply-side) is adequately compensated
for the services it provides, and pays for the costs it imposes on the
system as a whole. These are not easy tasks.
II. RENEWABLE ENERGY
One appeal of renewable sources of power such as solar, wind and tidal
or wave energy, is its absence of GHG emissions. Viewed on a lifecycle
basis, these sources of power emit far fewer GHGs than their fossil
fueled counterparts,42 and compare favorably on other environmental
reserves refers to additional generating capacity that can provide power quickly, say
within 10 minutes, upon request from the grid operator.”).
39. See id.
40. This system attempts to address the inadequate incentives to invest in
infrastructure resources such as generation capacity by addressing the imperfections in
the market’s design. The resulting “energy only” market does not remove the need for
regulatory interventions, but substantially changes the nature of those interventions. See
William W. Hogan, On an “Energy Only” Electricity Market Design for Resource Adequacy,
HARV. JOHN F. KENNEDY SCH. OF GOV’T 34 (Sept. 23, 2005), available at http://www.
hks.harvard.edu/fs/whogan/Hogan_Energy_Only_092305.pdf.
41. “Capacity markets provide economic incentives to attract investment in new
and existing supply-side and demand-side capacity resources . . . . [T]he [Forward Capacity
Market] contains an auction structure through which capacity resources compete to
obtain a market-priced capacity payment, in exchange for a commitment to be available
in the years ahead to meet the region’s electricity [demands].” See Capacity Market, ISO
NEW E NG ., http://www.iso-ne.com/nwsiss/grid_mkts/how_mkts_wrk/cap_mkt/index.html
(last visited Jun 16, 2011).
42. “Greenhouse gas emissions . . . were generally estimated according to the full
operational life cycle of each renewable energy technology including CO2e emissions
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criteria as well. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration,
total American electric generation from the electric power sector was a
little over 2.4 million gigawatt-hours (“GWh”) in 2010.43 Of that total,
coal-fired generation represented about 1.4 million GWh, natural gasfired generation nearly another 380,000 GWh, and nuclear power about
424,000 GWh.44 Non-hydro renewables represented only 130,000 GWh.45
Why then, haven’t renewables achieved greater penetration in American
electricity markets?
A. The Rise of Renewables
Technically speaking, a great deal of potential wind and solar energy
remains untapped in the United States.46 Indeed, if cost (and opportunity
cost) were no object, we could easily generate more power using the wind
and the sun than we consume each year. However, costs (and opportunity
costs) do matter. In most locations, the delivered cost of wind and solar
power is higher than power from other sources.47 However, the cost of
generating electricity from renewable sources has decreased over time,48

from manufacturing of the plant to full operation of the technology . . . . The emissions
are found to vary widely within each technology . . . . Overall, wind has the lowest
CO2e emissions, with only around 25 g/kW h CO2e. Hydro and photovoltaics also have
low emissions, with average reported values at less than 100 g/kW h CO2e. The average
emissions from geothermal are fair at 170 g/kW h, however the range includes all
possible values for gas emissions and may even be as high as a low-emitting coal fired
power station. For all technologies except hydro, CO2e emissions account for all significant
carbon emissions.” See Annette Evans et al., Assessment of Sustainability Indicators for
Renewable Energy Technologies, 13 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1082,
1084 (2009), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S136403210
8000555.
43. Total Electric Power Industry Summary Statistics, Year-to-Date 2011 and 2010,
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., available at https://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/excel/
epmxlfilees1_b.xls.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Charmaine Watts, Going Completely Renewable:
Is it Possible (Let Alone Desirable)?, 22 THE ELECTRICITY J. 95, 103 (2009) (“[T]he
United States has an enormous cache of renewable energy resources that it has only
begun to utilize.”).
47. The mean price of electricity for photovoltaic and wind power is $0.24 kW h
and $0.07 kW h respectively. This compares to $0.042 kW h for coal and $0.048 kW h
for gas. These numbers account for the cost of capital, but not the cost of transmission,
which can add up to $0.015 kW h when long transmission lines are necessary. Transmission
over long distances is more common with renewables than non-renewables. See Annette
Evans et al., Assessment of Sustainability Indicators for Renewable Energy
Technologies, 13 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1082, 1083–84 (2009).
48. “[C]ontinued technological advances will likely make renewable power plants
cheaper. If current trends continue, the cost of solar electricity generation is expected to
drop to 6 to 10¢/kWh by 2020 due to improvements in module production through
thinner layers, the introduction of a broader range of materials (including crystalline
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stimulated in part by government incentives and regulatory mandates.
Specifically, we can point to three types of policies that have given a push to
renewable electricity since the latter part of the 20th century: renewable
portfolio standards, tax incentives, and carbon regulation.
Renewable portfolio standards. As noted above, PURPA had given a
boost to renewable electricity in the 1980s, stimulating a great deal of
small hydro development, as well as some wind and solar development.49
At around the same time, states began establishing “renewable portfolio
standards” (“RPSs”), requiring electric utilities to buy a specified
percentage (or, in some cases, amount) of electricity from renewable
sources.50 Since the 1980s, more than half of American states have
adopted some form of a RPS. State RPSs vary widely: each define
“renewable energy” differently, and establishes different targets as well,
from Minnesota’s requirement that 25 percent of all electricity come
from renewables by the year 202551 and California’s requirement that
utilities acquire one-third of their electricity from renewables by 2020,52
to Texas’s rather modest goals, which are established not in percentages
of power sold but rather in megawatts (“MW”) of capacity.53 In the

silicon, gallium arsenide, cadmium telluride, copper indium selenide, and recycled silicon),
the integration of glass and PV production facilities, the construction of adhesives onsite, innovative designs, and better economies of scale. The same ‘learning effect’ will
likely reduce costs by 20 to 60 percent for other wind and bioelectric power stations.”
See Sovacool & Watts, supra note 46, at 98–99.
49. See Sanya Carley, Historical Analysis of U.S. Electricity Markets: Reassessing
Carbon Lock-in, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 720, 725 (2010), available at http://www.science
direct.com/science/article/pii/S0301421510007962 (“PURPA additionally gave rise to
wind and industrial steam technologies, promoted the re-entry of small hydro dams, and
encouraged research and development efforts in other technologies, such as the fuel cell,
solar troughs, and fluidized bed combustion boilers.”).
50. These targets, and definitions of qualified sources vary by state. For up-to-date
information about state RPSs, see DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES &
EFFICIENCY, http://www.dsireusa.org/.
51. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1691 (2010).
52. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.30(c)(2) (West 2011) (“The quantities of eligible
renewable energy resources to be procured for all other compliance periods reflect
reasonable progress in each of the intervening years sufficient to ensure that the
procurement of electricity products from eligible renewable energy resources achieves
25 percent of retail sales by December 31, 2016, and 33 percent of retail sales by
December 31, 2020.”).
53. Texas’s goals are modest for two reasons. First, each time the legislature has
raised the target, the market has already built nearly that much capacity. Second, the
goals are essentially voluntary, and there are no significant financial consequences for
retail energy providers who fail to meet them. See TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.904 (West
1999), amended by TEX. UTIL. CODE § 39.904 (West 2005) (replacing the renewable
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summer of 2009, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2454, the
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, also known as the
“Waxman-Markey bill,”54 which would have established a national RPS
effective in 2012 (with an ultimate goal of requiring utilities to secure 20
percent of their electricity from renewable sources by the year 2020).55
Its companion bill in the Senate was S. 1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and
American Power Act, also known as the “Kerry-Boxer bill.”56 The
Kerry-Boxer bill did not include a national RPS, and it was never reported
out of committee in the Senate; for its part, the Waxman-Markey bill was
pronounced “dead on arrival” in the Senate by various commentators.57
The prospects for a federal RPS in the 112th Congress are uncertain at
best. In his 2011 State of the Union address, President Obama proposed
a “Clean Energy Standard” that would include some non-renewables
under the definition of clean energy.58 Although there have been reports
that legislation reflecting the president’s plan will be introduced in the
Senate,59 the Republican-controlled House of Representatives may be
less favorably disposed to any sort of federal clean energy legislation,
including a federal RPS. Nonetheless, despite the lack of a national RPS,
some analysts credit state RPSs for increases in the development of
renewable electricity.60
capacity targets every two years from 2003–2009, with new targets every two years from
2007–2015). For an excellent comparison of state RPS programs, and assessment of
their effectiveness, see Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National
RPS, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1339 (2010).
54. H.R. Res. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009) (enacted) [hereinafter Waxman-Markey].
The named sponsors are Congressman Henry Waxman of California and Congressman
Ed Markey of Massachusetts.
55. Id. § 101.
56. S. Res. 1733, 111th Cong. (2010) [hereinafter Kerry-Boxer]. The named
sponsors are Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts and Senator Barbara Boxer of California.
Kerry-Boxer would impose many of the same new requirements as Waxman-Markey,
with a few differences. For example, it did not contain a national RPS.
57. Harry Fuller, Repubs Say Waxman-Markey Bill is DOA in Senate, ZDNET
(June 28, 2009), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/green/repubs-say-the-waxman-markey-billis-doa-in-senate/5667.
58. See President Barack Obama, 2011 State of the Union Speech (Jan. 25, 2011)
(copy of transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/
remarks-president-state-union-address) (“Some folks want wind and solar. Others want
nuclear, clean coal and natural gas. To meet this goal we will need them all . . . .”).
59. See Tom Udall, Mark Udall Introduce Renewable Standard Legislation, TOM
UDALL SEN. FOR N.M., http://tomudall.senate.gov/?p=press_release&id=815 (last visited
Jun. 2, 2011) (“U.S. Senators Tom Udall (D-NM) and Mark Udall (D-CO) today
continued their fight to enact a federal Renewable Energy Standard (RES) by introducing
legislation that would require utilities to generate 25 percent of their electricity from
wind, solar and other renewable energy sources by 2025.”).
60. See Renewable & Alternative Energy Portfolio Standards, CTR. FOR CLIMATE
& ENERGY SOLUTIONS, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/
rps.cfm (last updated Jan. 20, 2012) (“While the success of state efforts to increase
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Tax credits. Many analysts ascribe even more of the credit for the
growth in renewables to federal tax incentives. Ever since the 1970s, the
federal government has periodically offered production tax credits and/or
investment tax credits to wind, solar and other sources of renewable
electricity. These programs have typically of a very short duration, but
have been renewed regularly.61 Production tax credits compensate
producers (in the form of reductions of their tax liability) on a per kWh
of renewable electricity produced basis. Investment tax credits offer
similar tax liability reductions for investments in renewable electricity.
The current federal production tax credit for wind power, for example, is
2.2 cents per kWh.62
Some contend that investment in wind and solar power has been
disadvantaged over the years by the unpredictability of these tax credits.
In the early 2000s, for example, a backlog on wind turbine orders slowed
many wind projects, partly because wind turbine producers were dissuaded
from investing in additional plant capacity by the unpredictability of
federal renewable tax credits.63 Nevertheless, production tax credits seem
to be a fairly powerful incentive. For instance, the production tax credit
for wind power has, on occasion, been credited with producing negative
prices for electricity at night in West Texas, where wind power
producers paid (something less than 2 cents per kWh) to dispatch their
power to the grid in order to receive the production tax credit (of about 2
cents per kWh).64

renewable or alternative energy production will depend in part on federal policies such as
production tax credits, states have been effective in encouraging clean energy generation.”).
61. The energy package signed by President Carter in 1978 included investment
tax credits and accelerated depreciation for alternative energy projects. These tax credits
expired during the Reagan administration. In 1992, Congress established a production
tax credit for renewable energy projects in the Energy Policy Act of 1992. Congress has
intermittently renewed short-term investment and/or production tax credits for renewable
energy ever since, and production credits still remain in effect.
62. See Form 8835, IRS, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8835.pdf.
63. “While the industry was fortunate to gain short-term extensions in the past,
these shorter time periods create uncertainty and a ‘boom-and-bust’ cycle of short-term
planning, near annual job layoffs and higher cost projects. Without a long-term policy,
manufacturers are discouraged from investing in, and expanding, manufacturing
facilities in the U.S.” See Production Tax Credit (PTC), AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N,
available at http://www.awea.org/issues/federal_policy/upload/PTC_April-2011.pdf (last
visited Jun. 9, 2011).
64. See Lessons Learned from Renewable Energy Credit (REC) Trading in Texas,
B UREAU OF ECON. GEOLOGY 20 (2009), available at http://www.beg.utexas.edu/
energyecon/transmission_forum/CEE_Texas_RPS_Study.pdf (wind generators, which
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Carbon regulation. At first blush, it may seem unlikely that carbon
regulation has stimulated development of renewable electricity. While
the United States signed the Kyoto Accord in the 1990s (pledging
reductions in GHG emissions65), the United States never ratified the
agreement, and Congress has since declined to enact legislation regulating
GHG emissions.66 However, where Congress has been quiet, voluntary
markets, the states, and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)
have been active. For example, the Chicago Climate Exchange operates a
voluntary market in “carbon offsets,” through which purchasers seeking to
reduce their carbon footprint pay others to reduce CO2e emissions.67 Much
of the demand for these offsets comes from outside the United States,
though some companies and individuals within the country choose to
purchase offsets voluntarily. According to a 2008 government accountability
office study:
A wide variety of consumers buy offsets, including individuals, businesses,
nonprofits, governments, research institutions, universities, religious congregations,
utilities, and other organizations. Consumers’ motivations for purchasing offsets
may include corporate responsibility and public relations, among others.68

At the state level, in 2006 the State of California enacted AB 32, a law
establishing a statewide program of GHG emission regulation that aims
to reduce emissions in California to 1990 levels by the year 2020.69 AB
32 recently survived a judicial challenge70 and the state governor has
needed wind power to be dispatched to collect production tax credits, submitted negative
bids in certain hours).
65. See What Does the Kyoto Protocol Mean to U.S. Energy Markets and the U.S.
Economy?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 2 (Oct. 1998), available at http://www.eia.gov/
oiaf/kyoto/pdf/kyotobrf.pdf (“The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated by more than 160 nations
in December 1997, aims to reduce net emissions of certain greenhouse gases.”).
66. “[U]ntil recently, the federal government’s attitude toward climate change
ranged from ‘simple inaction to outright obstructionism,’ with little meaningful federal
regulation and documented efforts to play down the extent and serious effects of climate
change.” Margaret Rosso Grossman, Climate Change and the Law, 58 AM. J. COMP. L.
223, 231 (2010).
67. “Chicago Climate Exchange is North America’s largest and longest running
greenhouse gas emission [offsets] program. From 2003 through 2010 CCX operated as a
comprehensive cap and trade program with an offsets component. In 2011 CCX
launched the Chicago Climate Exchange Offsets Registry Program to register verified
emission reductions based on a comprehensive set of established protocols.” Chicago
Climate Exchange, I NTERCONTINENTAL E XCHANGE , http://www.chicagoclimatex.com/
content.jsf?id=23 (last visited June 9, 2011).
68. Carbon Offsets: The U.S. Voluntary Market is Growing, but Quality Assurance
Poses Challenges for Market Participants, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 10 (Aug.
2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d081048.pdf.
69. This law has proven controversial and may be the subject of a failed recall
referendum in California.
70. See Margot Roosevelt, Prop. 23 Campaign Concedes Defeat, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2010), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2010/11/prop-23-defeat-global-warming-
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pledged to meet that commitment.71 Furthermore, using its unique power to
establish independent automotive standards under the Clean Air Act,72
the State of California in 2005 sought EPA permission to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions from vehicles, permission that was ultimately
granted by the Obama administration in 2009.73 Other states have been
active as well. In 2005, a group of northeastern states formed the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), a cooperative effort to regulate
GHGs within their borders using a marketable permit system 74 not
unlike the one already in place in the European Union.75 The Western

climate-change.html (“Backers of Proposition 23, the ballot initiative to suspend
California’s ambitious global warming law, conceded defeat.”). Also, I found information on
a current judicial challenge to AB 32: “California’s measures to combat climate change
have suffered a temporary setback last week as Judge Ernest A. Goldsmith of San
Francisco Superior Court enjoined California’s Air Resources Board (CARB) from
further rule-making to implement the California Global Warming Solutions Act (A.B.
32) in Association of Irritated Residents v. California Air Resources Board. The main
crux of the opinion is that the Air Resources Board, which is tasked with preparing and
approving a ‘Scoping Plan’ to reduce carbon emissions to 1990 levels by 2020 by A.B.
32, did not consider any alternatives to the cap and trade scheme it eventually decided
on. The Court stated that ‘the A.R.B. seeks to create a fait accompli by premature
establishment of a cap-and-trade program before alternatives can be exposed to public
comment and properly evaluated by the A.R.B. itself.’” Sinan Diniz, California’s
Climate Change Law Suffers Legal Setback, GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. (Mar. 25, 2011),
http://gielr.wordpress.com/2011/03/25/californias-climate-change-law-suffers-legal-setback.
71. See Peter Henderson, California Gov. to Get Chance to ‘Mark’ Climate Law,
REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/17/carbon-californiaidUSN1719801220110417 (“Brown’s support of the state’s broad climate change law
was a hallmark of his campaign last year to be governor again . . . .”).
72. California is the only state authorized to establish its own standards for
automobiles. The other 49 states may choose to apply either the federal standards or the
California standards.
73. California’s petition to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from cars was
rejected by EPA during the Bush administration on the grounds that carbon dioxide is
not a “pollutant” under the Clean Air Act. In Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court
determined that EPA does have the power to regulate carbon dioxide as a pollutant under
the Clean Air Act. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007). In June of
2009, EPA during the Obama administration reversed its position and granted California
permission to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from cars. Gary Gengel & Kegan
Brown, President Obama Directs EPA to Reconsider California Waiver Request to Regulate
Greenhouse Gases, BLOOMBERG L. REP. (2009), available at http://www.lw.com/upload/
pubContent/_pdf/pub2779_1.pdf.
74. Under RGGI, participating states are seeking a 10% reduction in carbon
dioxide emissions from within their borders by 2018.
75. Under the RGGI program, most marketable permits (called “emissions
allowances”) are auctioned off to emitters, and the proceeds invested in energy efficiency,
renewable energy, and other clean energy technologies. This marks a contrast with the
acid rain program, in which pollution rights are distributed to emitters free of charge,
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Climate Initiative, a western counterpart to RGGI, has struggled to get
off the ground.76 Meanwhile, the Obama EPA has begun the process
of regulating GHGs as pollutants under the Clean Air Act.77 That effort
has met with resistance from Republicans and coal state Democrats in
Congress.78 However, as support for climate science’s basic conclusions
grows worldwide,79 and EPA and the states continue to press for GHG
emissions limits, the relative price of fossil fuel generation seems likely to
increase.
All of these developments—state RPSs, tax credits and carbon
regulation—have stimulated innovation and improvements in wind and

based on past emissions. The European Union’s carbon trading scheme also distributes
its pollution rights free of charge, for the most part.
76. “The Western Climate Initiative (“WCI”) will be the most ambitious attempt to
reduce GHGs and combat global warming. However, with ambitions come pragmatic
problems, chief among these is the question of how to enforce the parties’ compliance
with their obligations under the WCI. This is particularly relevant because the WCI
contains no enforcement body, and relies on nothing but the good faith of the individual
jurisdictions to enforce the agreement.” See Brooks V. Rice, The “Triumph” of the
Commons: An Analysis of Enforcement Problems and Solutions in the Western Climate
Initiative, 22 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 401, 402 (2010).
77. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring
Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514 (June 3, 2010) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51, 52, 70, and
71).
78. “Congressional Republicans vowed Wednesday to prevent the Environmental
Protection Agency from reducing the pollution that contributes to global warming,
underscoring the threat with a proposed deep cut to the agency’s budget. ‘Congress
intends to reassert itself in the statutory and regulatory process at EPA and specifically
the Clean Air Act,’ said Rep. Ed Whitfield, R-Ky., chair of a House subcommittee on
energy and power at the start of a hearing Wednesday on a draft bill that would block the
EPA from using the act to control heat-trapping pollution.” Dina Cappiello, Global
Warming Fix Heats up Hearing with EPA Chief, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://www.timesfreepress.com/news/2011/feb/10/global-warming-fix-heats-hearing-epa
-chief/?print.
79. In 2008, “the Rudd government released a ‘Green Paper’ outlining its initial
plans for a Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS), a policy based on a cap-andtrade approach to emissions reductions along the lines of the European Emissions
Trading Scheme (ETS). A ‘White Paper’ outlining the final plans for the proposed
CPRS was subsequently released in December, 2008, as the Australian government
announced a emissions reductions target of between 5% (unilaterally) and 15% (in
concert with other nations) reduction below 2020 levels, and a proposed 60% reduction
by 2050 (Commonwealth of Australia, 2008). In the face of severe criticism for its lack
of ambition (Foley, 2008) the government justified its target in terms of the implications
for per capita emissions, which it argued were on par with those promised by other
nations. It was not long before the Rudd government responded to its critics who said
that the targets were not ambitions enough. In May, 2009 the interim target was
increased to a 25% reduction and the proposed starting implementation date for the
CPRS was delayed to 2011, justified on the need to allow the economy to regain strength
in the aftermath of the global financial crisis (Australian Government, 2009a).” Roger
A. Pielke, Jr., An Evaluation of the Targets and Timetables of Proposed Australian
Emissions Reduction Policies, 14 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 20, 21 (Nov. 13, 2010), available
at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/admin/publication_files/2010.36.pdf.
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solar power projects. The wind turbines of today are much larger and
more efficient than the wind turbines of the late 20th century.80 In the
first decade of the 21st century, installed wind power capacity in United
States has grown fifteen-fold, from 2,472 MW in 2000 to 40,180 MW in
2010.81 Likewise, photovoltaic (“PV”) solar cells have grown more
energy-efficient over time,82 and thin-film solar technology has helped
improve the cost efficiency of PV solar power. Concentrated solar
power (“CSP”) has experienced similar efficiency improvements.83 As a
consequence, installed solar capacity in United States by the top 10 solar
utilities has doubled since 2009.84 Not surprisingly, the U.S. Energy

80. “[T]he main trends dominating the wind energy market in recent years . . .
[are] the size increase of contemporary [wind turbines], . . . efficiency improvements,
and a long-term reduction of the specific investment cost per kW (turnkey cost).” See
John K. Kaldellis & D. Zafirakis, The Wind Energy (R)evolution: A Short Review of a
Long History, 36 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1887, 1894 (2011), available at http://www.
sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0960148111000085.
81. U.S. Installed Wind Capacity and Wind Project Locations, U.S. DEP’T OF
ENERGY, http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/wind_installed_capacity.asp#current (last
visited June 13, 2011).
82. See Martin A. Green, The Path to 25% Silicon Solar Cell Efficiency: History of
Silicon Cell Evolution, 17 PROGRESS IN PHOTOVOLTAICS: RESEARCH & APPLICATIONS
183, 183 (2009), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/pip.892/abstract
(“The first silicon solar cell was reported in 1941 and had less than a 1% energy
conversion efficiency compared to the 25% efficiency milestone reported in this paper.
Standardization of past measurements shows there has been a 57% improvement
between confirmed results in 1983 and the present result.”).
83. “The key to the commercial development of CSP is establishing a consistent
annual deployment schedule leading to lower costs. In a US-DOE sponsored study,
Sargent and Lundy (2003) estimated that such cost reductions could be realized through
economies of scale by building large plants, through learning-curve experience with
manufacturing components in volume, and through technical improvements from
continuing research (Shinnar and Citro, 2006). The Solar Energy Task Force of the
Western Governors’ Association (WGA) concluded that CSP electricity prices of
$0.10/kWh or lower are possible with construction of 4 GW by 2015 (San Diego
Regional, 2005; WGA, 2006). To help meet the CSP deployment goal, the USDOE’s Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Office and the WGA agreed to
promote the installation of 1 GW of new parabolic trough CSP plants by 2010.” Vasilis
M. Fthenakis et al., The Technological, Geographical, and Economic Feasibility for
Solar Energy to Supply the Energy Needs of the US, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 387, 390 (2009),
available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0301421508004072.
84. Table 4 U.S. Electric Net Summer Capacity, 2005–2009, U.S. ENERGY INFO.
ADMIN. (Aug. 2010), http://www.eia.gov/cneaf/alternate/page/renew_energy_consump/
table4.html.
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Information Administration projects further growth in installed capacity
for these electricity generation technologies in the near future.85
B. Limits to Growth: Intermittency, Variability, and Geography
While renewables have done well in recent years, it remains true
that most new renewable electricity comes from wind energy. Growth in
wind power dwarfs the growth of all other renewable resources over the
last decade. Of course, wind power is intermittent. It increases and
decreases as wind speeds change. Therefore, the amount of electricity
generated by a wind farm over time will be significantly less predictable
than the amount of electricity generated by fossil fuel generation. This
poses a problem for grid operators, who must continuously balance loads.
Wind power is dispatched to the grid whenever it is available because in
the usual case, generation sources are dispatched to the grid in ascending
order of marginal cost. The marginal cost of wind generation is effectively
zero, and so it is dispatched even before cheap coal power. Thus,
because of the possibility that wind generation levels may decrease at any
moment, grid operators must maintain spinning reserves and regulation
from other sources.
Because grid operators cannot count on wind capacity, they may deny
wind generation capacity credits available to more reliable sources
of electricity, and/or penalize wind generators financially for failing to
provide forecasted amounts of energy and for the additional ancillary
services that must be made available to back up wind. Wind generators
claim that these practices are unfair, and that wind forecasting has improved
greatly,86 reducing the amount of regulation and reserves needed to
supplement wind power. FERC apparently agrees, and in November 2010
it proposed a rule on the integration of “variable energy resources”
(“VERs”).87 The proposed rule would require transmission utilities

85. The Annual Energy Outlook 2011 contains three different scenarios for the
growth of renewable energy. Under the Reference Case, it is assumed that existing laws
and regulations will remain unchanged throughout the projection period, unless the
legislation establishing the law sets a sunset date or specifies how they will change. The
No Sunset Case assumes the extension of tax credits for renewable energy sources and
for energy-efficient building equipment. The Extended Policies Case includes the No
Sunset assumptions, plus an increase in certain energy-efficiency standards. “In 2035,
the share of total electricity generation accounted for by renewables is 14 percent in the
Reference Case, as compared with 16 percent in the No Sunset case and the Extended
Policies case.” See Annual Energy Outlook 2011 with Projections to 2035, U.S. ENERGY
INFO. ADMIN. 18–21 (Apr. 2011), available at http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/aeo/pdf/0383
(2011).pdf.
86. Joshua Z. Rokach, Bending to the Wind, 24 THE ELECTRICITY J. 86, 88 (2011).
87. “Accordingly, the Proposed Rule would: (1) require public utility transmission
providers to offer intra-hourly transmission scheduling; (2) incorporate provisions
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(including RTOs and ISOs) to schedule transmission in smaller increments
of time (15 minutes rather than 60 minutes), thereby increasing the
probability that wind power will hit its projected generation target within
the specified increment. In order to promote centralized wind forecasting,
the rule would require wind generators to provide wind forecasting data
to transmission utilities. Finally, the rule would also require transmission
utilities to provide regulation service necessary to support wind. FERC
hopes that these changes will ease wind integration into the transmission
system.
Nevertheless, wind power remains an intermittent resource, and must
be backed up by other sources. When that source is a fossil fuel generator,
that generator will be burning fuel and producing emissions, even if it is
not dispatching electricity to the grid. Moreover, a fossil fuel generator
will be cycling up and down to match the variability of wind production.
This means that the fossil fuel generator will be operating less efficiently,
causing more wear and tear (and costs). More importantly, it will be
consuming more fuel per megawatt-hour (MWh) of electricity dispatched to
the grid, and therefore produce more pollution emissions.
Thus, if wind power is displacing fossil fuel generation, it will result
in a reduction of GHG emissions, but not on a MWh to MWh basis.
Recently, there have been a number of studies on the environmental
effects of integrating wind into the electric grid, and they have reached
somewhat inconsistent conclusions. The Eastern Wind Integration Study88
examined four scenarios: three involved 20 percent penetration of wind
into the Eastern Interconnection (about a tenfold increase above current
levels) in different onshore and offshore configurations, and a fourth

into the pro forma Large Generator Interconnection Agreement requiring interconnection
customers whose generating facilities are variable energy resources to provide
meteorological and operational data to public utility transmission providers for the
purpose of power production forecasting; and (3) add a generic ancillary service rate
schedule through which public utility transmission providers will offer regulation service
to transmission customers delivering energy from a generator located within the
transmission provider’s balancing authority area. The proposed reforms will remove
barriers to the integration of variable energy resources.” Integration of Variable Energy
Resources, 133 Fed. Reg. 61,149, 61,149 (Nov. 18, 2010), amending 18 C.F.R.
§ 35.28(c)–(f), available at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/2010/111810/E1.pdf.
88. EnerNex Corp., Eastern Wind Integration and Transmission Study, NAT’L
RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB. (Feb. 2011), available at http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systems
integration/pdfs/2010/ ewits_final_report.pdf.
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looked at 30 percent wind penetration.89 Carbon emissions reductions
under these scenarios ranged from between 4 and 5 percent in the three
“20 percent wind scenarios,” and jumped to more than 18 percent in the
“30 percent wind scenarios.” Assuming future regulation yielding a high
($100/ton) carbon price, emissions reductions jump to more than 32
percent.90 By contrast, a study of the integration of wind at high levels
in Colorado and Texas, performed by the Bentek Corporation, concluded
that integration of wind into those systems would require the cycling of
coal-fired power plants; consequently, emissions reductions from
integration of wind were negligible (for carbon dioxide) or negative
(for sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides). 91 A study of the effects of
integrating wind in the Southwest Power Pool reached similar conclusions,
crediting the need to cycle coal plants more frequently.92
In some systems, however, wind power is backed up by something other
than fossil fueled generators. In the Scandinavian grid, for example,
Danish wind power is backed up by hydroelectric power, some of it
Danish and some of it from elsewhere in Scandinavia.93 The Spanish
system also backs up renewables with hydroelectric power.94 While
hydroelectric power does not generate carbon emissions, using hydroelectric
power to match wind requires hydroelectric stations to operate in storage
rather than run-of-river mode,95 which has adverse impacts on wetlands
89. The authors of the study deemed each of these scenarios technically feasible,
but each would require additional investments and transmission infrastructure. They also
concluded that with proper infrastructure investments, these levels of wind penetration
would increase electricity prices by only about a half a cent per kWh. Id. at 27–30.
90. Id. at 47–50.
91. How Less Became More: Wind, Power and Unintended Consequences in the
Colorado Energy Market, B ENTEK E NERGY 73 (2010), available at http://www.bentek
energy.com/Index.aspx.
92. See J. Nicholas Puga, The Importance of Combined Cycle Generating Plants in
Integrating Large Levels of Wind Power Generation, 23 ELECTRICITY J. 33, 33 (2010).
93. “As found in Northern Germany and Denmark, where wind is already
responsible for 20% of generation, balancing may be achieved through good forecasting
and use of geographic, as well as fuel, diversification. Here stored hydroelectric power
and natural gas generation back up intermittent renewable supply . . . .” See M.K.
Heiman, Expectations for Renewable Energy Under Market Restructuring: The U.S.
Experience, 31 ENERGY 1052, 1057 (2005).
94. “Over the last ten years, [feed-in tariff] systems have become an effective
instrument for European countries to generate electricity from [renewable energy sources
(“RES”)], especially through wind turbine production. Germany, Denmark, and Spain
have been the most successful of these countries. Through this system, distributors are
required to buy the energy generated by RES at the price determined by the regulator for
a certain period of time.” See Aitor Ciarreta et al., Renewable Energy Sources in the
Spanish Electricity Market: Instruments and Effects, 15 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE
ENERGY REV. 2510, 2514 (2011), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/
article/pii/S1364032111000724.
95. A standard hydroelectric project can store water behind the dam and let the
reservoir level rise when power is not needed, and run water through the powerhouse to
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and aquatic ecology in the reservoirs of hydroelectric facilities. Moreover,
sometimes other values will trump carbon emissions considerations.
Recently, high river flows caused the temporary oversupply of
hydroelectricity in the Northwest, leading the Bonneville Power
Administration to limit the dispatch of otherwise available wind energy,
in order to protect fisheries in the affected rivers and the reliability of the
grid.96
More work needs to be done to resolve these conflicting projections,
but there may be reason for some optimism. From a climate change
point of view, it would be ideal if wind power could be backed up by
another clean resource. Nuclear power cannot cycle quickly enough to
back up wind, and is facing its own set of political and other problems in
the wake of the Fukushima disaster.97 The use of hydroelectric power as
a backup for wind in Scandinavia and Spain seems ideal from a climate
change perspective, but is only an option where hydroelectric power is
plentiful and where there is a willingness to operate hydro stations to
back up wind. As a backup for wind, natural gas is an option and has
advantages over coal. It emits fewer GHGs, and newer combined cycle
gas turbines are being built to cycle up and down more efficiently,
reducing the emissions associated with cycling.98 Moreover, the emissions
effects of cycling in even the older, less efficient gas-fired turbines are
less severe than those associated with cycling coal plants. Some speculate
that solar power can match wind effectively, since their production profiles
are complementary. The wind tends to blow harder at night, when the
sun isn’t shining, and less so during the day. It may also be possible to
generate electricity when power is needed. The alternative (and the norm in the United
States) is to operate hydroelectric projects in run of river mode, such that the amount of
water entering the reservoir from upstream equals the amount of water being run through
the powerhouse any given moment. Pumped storage hydroelectric projects do not use a
dam and are designed as storage facilities. In pump storage projects, water is pumped
uphill to a reservoir for storage, and then run down through a powerhouse when
electricity is needed.
96. Press Release, Bonneville Power Admin., High River Flows Caused Limits on
Thermal, Wind Generation (May 18, 2011), available at http://www.bpa.gov/corporate/
BPANews/ArticleTemplate.cfm?ArticleId=article-20110518-01.
97. See Simon Lomax, Japan Nuclear Crisis to Force U.S. Changes, NRC
Members Say, BLOOMBERG (June 16, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2011-0616/japan-nuclear-crisis-to-force-u-s-changes-nrc-members-say-1-.html (“Lawmakers and
regulators are taking a closer look at U.S. reactors after a magnitude-9 earthquake and
tsunami on March 11 knocked out power lines at Tokyo Electric Co.’s Fukushima DaiIchi plant”).
98. Puga, supra note 92, at 34.
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back up wind with demand-side resources, which are the subject of the
next section of this essay.
III. EFFICIENCY AND CONSERVATION
In principle, if our goal is to reduce the GHG intensity of our electric
generation mix, we could back up wind with demand response—short
term changes in demand that mirror changes in wind production. For
that matter, we could do even more to fight climate change with
demand-side management: that is, we could reduce our GHG emissions
(irrespective of any change in the electric generation mix) simply by
reducing the amount of electricity we use to provide the same services.
Indeed, some analysts point to conservation and greater energy efficiency as
the key to combating climate change. The logic of conservation and
efficiency is simple. It is not electricity that we really want: rather, it is
the services that electricity provides. If we can obtain those same
services using less electricity, we can (i) save money, and (ii) reduce the
environmental impacts associated with exploiting coal and other fuels to
generate electricity. Because we can save money by using energy more
efficiently, many of the gains associated with maximizing energy efficiency
are already being realized. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration, the energy intensity of the American economy (measured
in year 2000 dollars) declined from $19.57 per British thermal unit
(“BTU”) in 1949 to $8.52 per BTU in 2008.99 Businesses, in particular,
have exploited energy efficiency opportunities better since the energy
crises of the 1970s.
But there remain additional unrealized opportunities as well. The
American economy generates more output per capita than other economies;
however, despite efficiency gains, per capita energy consumption in the
United States remains very high—nearly double that of the average Western
European.100 Nearly half of the possible reductions for stabilizing GHG
concentrations that Socolow and Pacala identify in their stabilization
wedges analysis can be realized through various forms of conservation

99. See Annual Energy Review, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Oct. 19, 2011), available
at http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/aer/txt/ptb/0105.html.
100. In 2006, United States per capita consumption of primary energy was 334.6
million BTU, compared to 134.8 million BTU per capita in Europe. International Total
Primary Energy Consumption and Energy Intensity, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/international/energyconsumption.html (last visited Sept.
25, 2011). In 2007, estimates for electricity consumption as “kWh/capita” show that
U.S. individual demand (13,616 kWh) greatly exceeds demand in Germany (7,185
kWh), Spain (6,296 kWh), and the United Kingdom (6,142 kWh). See Key World
Energy Statistics, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY 48, 51, 57 (2009), available at http://www.iea.
org/textbase/nppdf/free/2009/key_stats_2009.pdf.
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or efficiency.101 Similarly, a recent study by the consulting firm McKinsey
and Co. predicted that energy efficiency investments could yield a 23
percent reduction in energy demand in the United States, and benefits
that more than double the costs.102
If there remain cost-effective opportunities to reduce energy consumption,
why aren’t these opportunities being realized?103 Some scholars ascribe
these unrealized opportunities to behavioral heuristics that prevent people
from recognizing the opportunities posed by efficiency investments, and
suggest that the problem is one of “norm activation.”104 Economist
Stephen DeCanio calls this tendency of consumers to miss opportunities
to save money through energy efficiency “the energy efficiency paradox.”105
John Dernbach argues that people pass up opportunities to save energy
and money because the issue of energy efficiency is not sufficiently
salient to them. They lack information about the energy they are using,
about opportunities to save money by using less energy, and (perhaps
most importantly) about how much energy their peers are using.
Dernbach argues that governments and private standard-setting
organizations can activate norms of energy efficiency by ensuring that
consumers understand national and local energy efficiency goals and
101. Pacala & Socolow, supra note 7, at 969–70. For a detailed breakdown of the
various energy efficiency law and policy improvements that might comprise these various
wedges, see John Dernbach, Stabilizing and Then Reducing U.S. Energy Consumption:
Legal and Policy Tools for Efficiency and Conservation, 37 ENVT’L L. REV. 10003,
10014–27 (2007).
102. Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy, MCKINSEY & CO. 7 (July
2009), available at http://www.mckinsey.com/Client_Service/Electric_Power_and_ Natural
_Gas/Latest_thinking/~/media/McKinsey/dotcom/client_service/EPNG/PDFs/Unlocking
%20energy%20efficiency/US_energy_efficiency_full_report.ashx.
103. The problem, argued McKinsey, is that the various energy-saving opportunities in
the U.S. economy are fragmented, spread across more than 100 million locations and
billions of individual devices, making coordinated solutions difficult. Thus, part of the
problem is that many of the remaining unrealized energy efficiency opportunities can be
realized only by individuals, not businesses. They are attached to individual consumers’
decisions: to purchase relatively energy inefficient homes, cars, and appliances, for example.
Id. at viii, 22–23.
104. See, e.g., Hunt Allcott & Sendhil Mullainathan, Behavior and Energy Policy,
327 SCIENCE 1204 (2010) (summarizing some of the literature on new norms and energy
consumption, and suggesting ways to activate norms of conservation and efficiency
investment); Michael P. Vandenbergh & Anne C. Steinemann, The Carbon Neutral
Individual, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1673, 1697 (2007); John C. Dernbach, Overcoming the
Behavioral Impetus for Greater U.S. Energy Consumption, 20 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 15 (2007).
105. Stephen J. DeCanio, The Efficiency Paradox: Bureaucratic and Organizational
Barriers to Profitable Energy-Saving Investments, 26 ENERGY POL’Y 441, 443 (1998).

293

SPENCE - FINAL NO AUTHOR EDITS TO ACCEPT (2) (DO NOT DELETE)

1/25/2016 11:29 AM

have access to information about their (and their peers’) energy usage.106
This view is echoed by many others,107 including the authors of the
McKinsey & Co. study.108 Of course, only some of these opportunities
involve electricity consumption; others involve consumption of
transportation fuels, natural gas in homes and businesses, etc. On the other
hand, Socolow and Pacala identify electricity consumption efficiency
(including demand reduction) as a stand-alone carbon wedge,109
implying the possibility of significant emissions reduction gains through
more efficient electricity consumption.
One way to promote demand reduction is to price the electricity to
reflect scarcity, that is, to allow consumers to be exposed to higher retail
prices when demand is highest and reserve (supply) margins lowest. A
few states are beginning to experiment with dynamic pricing,110 but only
tentatively. The ERCOT wholesale market in Texas, has recently moved
to “locational marginal pricing,” also known as “nodal pricing,” which
prices wholesale electricity in ways that reflect the full cost of delivery
to particular nodes on the Texas electric grid at particular times of day.111
This is a form of dynamic pricing at the wholesale level. However,
these tentative steps aside, state regulators have not shown much
appetite for this kind of dynamic pricing or real-time pricing at the retail
level,112 which, after all, exposes customers to substantial price risk.
106. Dernbach, supra note 104, at 28–35, 40.
107. See Michael P. Vandenberg, Order Without Social Norms: How Personal
Norm Activation Can Protect the Environment, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1101 (2005) (exploring the
implications of norm activation in environmental law generally); Michael P. Vandenberg,
Amanda R. Carrico & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Regulation in the Behavioral Era, 95
MINN. L. REV. 715, 763–79 (2011) (exploring the implications of behavioralism for
aspects of energy policy); Dean Karlan, Nudges for Energy Conservation, ECOALIGN
(June 2010), http://www.ecoalign.com/node/365?sid=3197 (proposing a variety of
regulatory policies aimed at promoting energy conservation); Robert Spencer & Mani
Vadari, Smart Grid: A Customer Challenge, 147 PUB. UTILS. FORTNIGHTLY 48 (2009),
available at http://www.fortnightly.com/display_pdf.cfm?id=10012009SmartGridCust
Challenge.pdf (contending that reducing consumption requires much more than new
pricing structures).
108. Unlocking Energy Efficiency in the U.S. Economy, supra note 102, at 26, 93,
95–97.
109. Pacala & Socolow, supra note 7, at 968–69.
110. Real-time pricing and dynamic pricing is referred to as a pricing system under
which customers would pay rates for electricity that reflect the cost of providing it is on a
real-time basis.
111. ERCOT—What’s Changing, ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TX., http://
nodal.ercot.com/about/wc/index.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
112. FERC is also encouraging the use of real-time pricing, or dynamic pricing,
reasoning that for electricity markets to allocate resources efficiently, electricity prices
must fluctuate. Specifically, during times of scarcity, high prices will provide customers
with an incentive to reduce their demand and will send a signal to prospective entrants to
the generating capacity market to increase supply. This requires the ability to measure
electricity consumption on a real-time basis, rather than the once-a-month, meter-reader
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In states that have moved to competitive retail markets, electricity retailers
manage price risk on behalf of their retail customers. Electric retailers
may face volatile scarcity prices as buyers in organized wholesale markets
(those managed by RTOs and ISOs), but they generally protect their
customers from those rapid price swings by offering customers fixed
price contracts or variable price contracts that mute the effects of shortterm wholesale price swings on retail prices. To protect themselves against
wholesale market price risks, utilities turn to futures markets or other
derivatives markets.113
For its part, FERC has promoted policies encouraging demand
response by nudging ISOs and RTOs to use demand reduction in times
of electricity scarcity. FERC’s Order 719 required ISOs and RTOs to
examine both demand- and supply-side responses to the problem of
scarcity, and required RTOs and ISOs to accept demand response bids in
supply-constrained spot markets for the physical delivery of electricity.114
FERC’s Order 890 did the same for the provision of ancillary services in
electricity markets.115 In addition, many ISOs and RTOs are addressing
the problem of long-term resource adequacy (that is, the problem of
ensuring that there will be adequate electric generating capacity in the
future) by maintaining “capacity markets,” in which electric service
providers pay suppliers of electric generating capacity for making that

measurements that have been traditional in the electricity industry. The introduction of
“smart meters” and “smart grid” architecture will enable these kinds of more refined
measurements. Many states are engaged in complementary efforts, which have led to the
introduction of smart meters and smart grid architecture in some parts of the country.
See FERC: Industries—Smart Grid, FERC, http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/
indus-act/smart-grid.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2011).
113. Derivatives markets allow companies exposed to price risk to hedge that risk
by purchasing the right to buy or sell energy at a fixed price in the future. An electricity
retailer may use futures or other types of derivatives to ensure the right to acquire
electricity on the wholesale market at a price certain in the future. Alternatively, it may
purchase a futures contract, which entitles it to purchase natural gas (to feed its natural
gas-fired electric generating facilities) at a price certain in the future. In this way,
derivatives products allow energy companies to minimize the effects of price swings in
the future. For more on energy derivatives markets, see David B. Spence, Can Law
Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 765, 804–06 (2008).
114. Order No. 719, Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electricity
Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 64,107 (Oct. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.
35).
115. Order No. 890-A, Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in
Transmission Service, 73 Fed. Reg. 2,984, 3,044–45 (Dec. 28, 2007) (to be codified at
18 C.F.R. pt. 37); Order 719, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,107.
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capacity available to serve load in the future.116 Order 719 specified
that ISOs and RTOs must accept bids for future demand reduction,
along with bids for supply capacity from plants, in those capacity
markets.117
More recently, FERC issued Order 745, requiring ISOs and RTOs to
compensate providers of demand response resources in balancing markets
by paying those providers the full locational marginal price for those
resources.118 FERC’s intention is to provide a further incentive for ISOs
and RTOs to look to demand response rather than generation alternatives
when trying to balance loads. Some commentators contend that paying full
locational marginal price for demand response resources overcompensates
the providers of those resources. Locational marginal prices reflect the
value of both generation capacity and the energy provided to a particular
location on the grid. The provider of demand response essentially agrees
to forgo consumption in order to help balance loads at a particular time
and place. Under Order 745, when a provider of demand response forgoes
consumption in this way, he forgoes paying for that energy. Critics say
that by compensating the provider of these demand response services
with a price that reflects not only the avoided generating capacity but also
the avoided energy costs, the provider is double compensated for those
energy costs.119 FERC has responded to these concerns by limiting the
requirement that providers of demand response receive full locational
marginal price for their resources to situations in which paying that price
increases net benefits to consumers as a group.120
All of these developments should push organized electricity markets
toward greater energy efficiency, but progress will be incremental. There
remains a strong political resistance to exposing end-users (at least,
residential consumers) to prices that reflect the true cost of delivered
electricity over short-term increments of time. This resistance will mean
that some price inefficiency will remain in the system, dampening the
energy efficiency gains realizable from proper pricing, for the foreseeable
future.
116. For a description of the New York Independent System Operator’s capacity
markets, see NYISO (About NYISO—Understanding the Markets—The Capacity Market),
NYISO, http://www.nyiso.com/public/about_nyiso/understanding_the_markets/capacity_
market/index.jsp (last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
117. Order No. 719, 73 Fed. Reg. at 64,114.
118. Order No. 745, Demand Response Compensation and Organized Electricity
Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 16,658, 16,666–67 (Mar. 15, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.
35).
119. Order No. 745, 76 Fed. Reg. at 16,662–63.
120. FERC established a “net benefits test” in Order 745 for determining when
consumers will benefit from the provision of demand response resources in organized
markets. That test is described at Order No. 745, 76 Fed. Reg. at 16,671.
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IV. CONCLUSION
A large part of our carbon emissions come from fossil fueled electric
generating plants. Therefore, it is entirely understandable that we might
look to renewable sources of electricity as a way to reduce our carbon
emissions, and to energy efficiency as a way to reduce our electricity
consumption. We know that we are capable of generating electricity
from wind, solar and other clean sources, and that we are improving our
ability to integrate that electricity into the grid. Similarly, we know that
there exist significant opportunities to reduce our electricity usage
through efficiency improvements. It follows, then, that we ought to be
able to drastically increase the percentage of electricity that comes from
renewable sources, and drastically decrease the amount of electricity we
consume. However, it is not that simple. There are still important and
fundamental impediments to the integration of very large quantities of
wind and solar power into the electric generation mix.
First, these sources of electricity remain significantly more expensive
than their traditional counterparts. Even if it were technically possible
for us to rely primarily on renewable sources of electricity, doing so would
drastically increase electricity costs. Second, renewable electricity is
often intermittent, and that intermittency continues to pose problems for
operators of the electric grid. In order to maintain a reliable electricity
delivery system, grid operators must find ways to match short-term
fluctuations in wind and solar power with corresponding adjustments to
other (often fossil-fueled) sources of power, and/or to demand. This is
not easy. More importantly, the process of scaling electricity production
from fossil-fueled plants up and down to match fluctuations in renewable
power reduces energy efficiency and increases the pollution intensity of
that generation. Thus, according to some recent studies, the integration
of much larger amounts of wind power into the electric system will
result in only nominal or small reductions in GHG emissions. As an
alternative, we might match fluctuation in renewable electricity supply
with demand-side responses in order to balance loads. However, that
too has proven a complicated and difficult proposition, at least so far.
There are behavioral impediments to investment in energy efficiency
improvements, and we underinvest in those kinds of improvements. For
its part, FERC is trying to encourage grid operators and electric utilities
to make better use of demand-side resources. Orders 719 and 745 provide
incentives and mandates that ought to result in better usage of demand
reduction and demand response as tools to balance loads. Nevertheless,
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electric retailers seem loath to expose retail customers to the kinds of
price risks that would encourage greater efficiency or demand response.
This is not to say that we are doomed to a fossil fueled future. Electric
utilities and their suppliers are devoting a great deal of energy and
creativity to overcoming the technical impediments to greater reliance on
clean sources of electricity, or to greater energy efficiency. Policymakers
are attempting to facilitate those efforts, so far in small and measured
ways. A policy or technical breakthrough could hasten this process along in
currently unforeseeable ways. However, in the near-term, it seems that
renewable energy and energy efficiency will remain a relatively small, if
growing, part of the electric system.
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